Vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) are one of the most important components in an Intelligent Transportation System (ITS), which aims to provide information communication between vehicles. A safety-critical vehicular communication requires security, privacy, auditability and efficiency. To satisfy these requirements simultaneously, several conditional privacypreserving authentication schemes are proposed by employing ring signature. However, these methods have been paid too little attention to the issues like how to choose the valid ring members or how to set up a ring. In this paper, we introduce an efficient conditional privacy-preserving scheme which provides an appropriate approach establishing the list of ring members. Moreover, our proposed scheme also supports batch verification to significantly reduce the computational cost. According to the analysis of security, our scheme is sufficiently resistant against several common attacks in VANETs. The performance results show that the proposed scheme is efficient and practical with both low computation and communication cost.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) as a special case of Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) optimized for vehicular environments play an important role in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). In a typical scenario of ITS, each vehicle broadcast traffic-related information, such as its speed, position, the road condition, etc. via VANETs. After receiving these broadcast messages, vehicles analyze and extract meaningful information to drivers, or take corresponding control actions in some emergencies. In this way, road safety and efficiency will be greatly enhanced, and this is essential for automated vehicles. However, due to the high demand for road safety features, to design a practical protocol for VANETs is highly nontrivial. Most of the proposed schemes are built based on the IEEE 802.11p standard.
In IEEE 802.11p, the participants in the road are classified into two categories, i.e., On-Board Units (OBUs) and Road-Side Units (RSUs). Each vehicle is equipped with an OBU for broadcasting messages and handling the received messages. The RSUs are usually fixed along roads as the base stations to provide Internet access and extra road information for vehicles. Therefore, VANETs provide two different types of communication, namely, vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) and vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) as shown in Fig. 1 . Because the broadcast messages are necessary in important applications, like collision avoidance, traffic optimization, we suppose that these messages have no necessary relevance to vehicles' identities. As a result, drivers can be reminded by receiving the broadcast messages from other vehicles or RSUs in VANETs. In practice, a trusted party, the Transportation Regulation Center (TRC), is needed to administrate the whole network. RSUs can connect with TRC for obtaining extra information. However, because of the open environment of VANETs, an attacker could send a forged message to confuse other drivers, which may further cause potential traffic hazards. To achieve road safety, it is essential to authenticate the validity of a message. The first serious discussions of road safety emerged in 2002 and utilized digital signatures [1] . After that, a considerable amount of work has been done based on different digital signature schemes [2] .
When applying digital signature schemes in VANETs, upon each message will attach some extra information including signature, signer's certificate and so on. This extra information may be used to link to the driver's true identity, and this may lead to privacy disclosure. Therefore, how to keep the anonymity of senders while the message can be authenticated by verifiers becomes another essential issue in VANETs. One common approach is to replace the true identity with a random-like string called pseudonyms. On the other hand, in some specific scenarios such as a traffic accident, there should be a possibility to reveal the true identity of senders according to the attached information. To this end, a function of auditability should be provided. Thus, authentication, privacy, and auditability are three basic requirements when designing a feasible scheme for communication in VANETs. Besides, due to the limited computation and storage capability of both OBUs and RSUs, efficiency should also be considered in VANETs.
In this paper, we propose a hybrid scheme, which employs ring signatures in VANETs with batch verification mode, and hereby efficiently enables auditability for ring members. More precisely, our contributions are summarized in the following:
• We propose a novel scheme for VANETs based on identity-based ring signature, where the procedure of creating a ring is restricted to make ring members auditable.
• We provide a batch mode for message verification. As indicated by performance, this makes our scheme highly efficient. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt that applies ring batch verification in VANETs.
• We give security analysis of the proposed scheme and implement our scheme in the Raspberry Pi 3b+ platform. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, some related work is presented to balance authentication and privacy in VANETs. Section III introduces the system model and some preliminary cryptographic primitives. In Section IV, a description of our schemes is given in detail. After that, security analysis and performance analysis are provided in Section V and Section VI respectively. Finally, Section VII concludes this paper and proposes some potential future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Numerous studies have attempted to employ pseudonym schemes to assure authentication and privacy simultaneously. specifically, the cryptography tools utilized include public key infrastructure (PKI), identity-based cryptography (IBC), group signature, ring signature and so on (for recent surveys, see [2] , [3] ).
At the early stages of the study, PKI is most widely used in VANETs. In these schemes based on PKI, as a trusted party, Certificate Authority (CA) is needed. Each vehicle broadcasts messages attached to the corresponding signatures and publickey certificates. Taking the SeVeCom project [4] as an example, the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) is utilized to assure efficiency. A pseudonym consists of two parts: a short-term key and its corresponding certificate. Since the use of certificates increases the communication overhead, it was alternatively suggested to employ IBC instead of certificates [1] , [5] .
Similarly, IBC-based schemes also adopt a set of shortterm public keys to form vehicles' pseudonyms, while the procedure of pseudonym issuance differs. Note that in IBCbased schemes, a new entity-private key generator (PKG)is introduced without the existence of CA. Thus, certificates are not attached when broadcasting messages in these schemes, and the communication overhead is thereby decreased.
There exists a major problem in both PKI-based and IBCbased pseudonym schemes: pseudonym change since it is not sufficient to use a single pseudonym to preserve vehicles' privacy. In these two kinds of schemes, using a single pseudonym is not sufficient to preserve the vehicle's privacy. As a simple setting, each vehicle is equipped with a set of public keys, each of which can be viewed as an unlinkable pseudonym, and expires after a fixed amount of time. Wiedersheim et al. [6] pointed out that simple pseudonym change is not enough to preserve privacy. There have been attempts on the strategy of pseudonym change, e.g., mix-zone-based [7] and mix-contextbased [8] . However, it is still mysterious to formalize the relationship between pseudonym change strategies and privacy level [2] , [9] .
The issue of pseudonym change can be eliminated in those schemes based on group signature and ring signature [2] , [10] , since messages are signed under the identity of a certain group rather than a single vehicle's pseudonym. Group signaturebased schemes allow a vehicle to sign a message anonymously on behalf of the group. In group signatures, a special entity called group manager can reveal any signer's real identity from the corresponding signature. Till now, there has been little agreement on the choice of group manager [2] . As the administrator of the group, the group manager has the privilege to add or delete a group member. It is then straightforward to achieve auditability of group members by the group manager. It was suggested that RSUs serve as group managers [11] , [12] . However, RSUs are vulnerable to some extent, and this setting is not sufficient to guarantee group members' privacy In comparison, ring signature-based schemes [13] - [15] further removes group managers by involving a set of different vehicles' public keys as the "group" (ring). In existing ring signature-based schemes, e.g., [13] , each vehicle can collect other vehicles' public keys on roads and thereby checks the validity of ring members before verification. Unfortunately, this would lead to verification failure when a malicious vehicle broadcasts an invalid public key. As depicted in Fig. 2 , due to the existence of a malicious vehicle in the ring, the generated signature by the whole ring would be rejected by other vehicles. In existing such schemes, privacy is the main focus while the lack of auditiability of ring members is still a problem [13] , [16] . Notably, Petit et al. [2] emphasize that these categories are not hard-edged so that several recent works combine different techniques from the previous categories. Survey [3] listed these hybrid schemes and discussed their security and efficiency in performance. These results pointed out that recently proposed schemes attempt to apply the batch verification of signatures into the verification procedure, which can greatly reduce the computation cost comparing with single verification.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly introduce the system model, and several cryptographic primitives, including bilinear pairings, identity-based encryption, and identity-based ring signature.
A. System model
Generally, our VANETs model consists of four main entities: the Transportation Regulation Center (TRC), Law Enforcement Authorities (LEA), RSUs and vehicles equipped with OBUs. The detailed description of these entities is listed as follows.
• TRC: The TRC is a fully trusted party in the VANETs system with sufficient computation and storage capabilities. TRC takes charge of system initialization and registration of other entities like RSUs and vehicles. We assume that TRC can establish a secure channel with each RSU. Besides, TRC is also responsible for identity reveal and OBU revocation. Typically, to record the identities of those invalid vehicles, TRC manages a revocation list.
• LEA: LEA is the agency for ensuring the accountability of vehicles. In other words, when a vehicle broadcasts fake messages anonymously on purpose, the LEA can reveal the identity of the vehicle with the help of TRC.
• RSUs: An RSU usually plays an auxiliary role between TRC and vehicles. Namely, RSUs can communicate with TRC through wired or wireless networks and broadcast messages to vehicles in a restricted region. In our system, RSUs can obtain a revocation list from TRC periodically and delivery ring-member lists to vehicles.
• Vehicles: Each vehicle in this system is equipped with a communication device called OBU. We assume that each OBU contains hardware security modules (HSM), and the required cryptographic operations are executed inside HSMs.
B. Bilinear pairings
Bilinear pairings have been widely used to design various cryptographic schemes over the last two decades [17] - [19] . Let G 1 , G 2 , G T be three cyclic groups of the same prime order q. Assume that the discrete logarithm problem in G 1 , G 2 and G T is hard. Letê : G 1 × G 2 → G T be a bilinear pairing with the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: ∀P ∈ G 1 , ∀Q ∈ G 2 and ∀a, b ∈ Z * q , e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q) ab ; 2. Non-degenerate: ∃P ∈ G 1 , ∃Q ∈ G 2 such that e(P, Q) = 1; 3. Computability: ∀g 1 ∈ G 1 ,∀g 2 ∈ G 2 , there is an efficient algorithm to computeê(g 1 , g 2 ). There are two hard-problem assumptions in bilinear pairings, i.e., Computational Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (CBDH) Problem and Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Problem, as described in the following. 3 , it is difficult to determine whether or not h =ê(P, Q) abc mod q.
C. Identity-based cryptography
Bilinear pairings are used to construct identity-based encryption and signature schemes. Compared to traditional PKI, identity-based cryptography avoids CA since each user's public key can be automatically derived from the corresponding identity(e.g., user's phone number, email address) In general, a common Identity-based cryptosystem contains two basic algorithms.
1. Setup(1 κ ) → pp: Taken the input of security parameter κ, the algorithm Setup(1 κ ) first chooses a master secret key s ∈ R Z * q , and then outputs the public parame-
When user i wants to obtain his/her public key and private key from the system, he/she first sends the specific identity ID i to system. After authentication is accepted, the system runs KeyGen(ID i ) to derive the user's public key pk i and private key sk i , where pk i = H 1 (ID i ) and sk i = s · pk i . The first practical identity-based encryption scheme [17] was proposed in 2001 by Boneh and Franklin. In the rest of this paper, we use Enc pki (·) and Dec ski (·) to denote the variant of Identity-based encryption and decryption algorithms in [17] respectively.
Furthermore, an identity-based ring signature is also used in our scheme, which requires verifiers to verify messages through a specific set of signers. Being different from the traditional signature, an identity-based ring signature scheme requires verifier to verify messages through a specific set of signers.
We adopt the identity-based ring signature in [18] in our proposed scheme. There are two essential algorithms, i.e., signature algorithm Sign ski (m, L) → σ and verification algorithm Verify L (σ, m) → 0/1, where m and L denote the message and the ring-member list, respectively.
IV. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we illustrate our scheme in detail. First, we use an abstract pseudonym life-cycle [2] as shown in Fig. 3 to roughly describe how our scheme works. We divide the whole life-cycle into six phases: initialization, key generation, ring list distribution, sign, verification and trace.
After the initialization of TRC, each vehicle or RSU is assumed to obtain a pair of the public key and private key from TRC. The public key in this system is also regarded as the corresponding pseudonym. RSU also obtains a set of vehicles' pseudonyms from TRC in the progress of the key generation.
Once a vehicle enters into a certain region, it obtains a fresh pseudonym list from the local RSU by sending its pseudonym. Then the vehicle can choose pseudonyms from the list to sign messages by identity-based ring signature. Other vehicles can verify the signature locally by using the public parameters preloaded in OBUs. Moreover, LEA can reveal the real identity with the help of TRC in some specific scenarios (typically for misbehaviors). RSUs update the pseudonym revocation list (PRL) from LEAs for filtering the requests from invalid pseudonyms. Relevant notations are listed in Table I .
A. Initialization
In the beginning, for the given security parameter κ, TRC chooses the master secret key s ∈ R Z * q randomly and outputs {G 1 , G 2 , G T , P, Q, P K 1 , P K 2 , q,ê, H 1 , H 2 , H} as illustrated in Section III-B. Then LEA chooses its private key s trac ∈ R Z * q randomly, and calculates the corresponding public key P K trac = s trac · Q. Finally, TRC sets the public parameters as PP = {G 1 , G 2 , G T , P, Q, P K 1 , P K 2 , P K trac , q,ê, H 1 , H 2 , H}. We emphasize that the pairing used in the proposed scheme is asymmetric, i.e., G 1 = G 2 (this kind of pairing is sometimes called type 3, e.g., see [20] ).
B. Key generation
After the initialization, vehicles, and RSUs obtain key pairs from TRC and pre-load P P . For a vehicle with its real identity VID i , TRC runs KeyGen(VID i ) and sends (PID i , PSK i , PP) to this vehicle. These parameters (PID i , PSK i , PP) are preloaded into the tamper-proof device in OBUs. For an RSU j with its real identity ID j , similarly, it obtains the key pair (RID j , RSK j ) from TRC, i.e. RSK j = s · RID j . The complete procedure is shown in Table II . 
Notations
Explanation s
The master secret key strac
The private key of LEA P Ktrac
The public key of LEA PP Public parameters VID i Real ID number of vehicle i PID i
Public key (pseudonym) of vehicle i PSK i
Private key of vehicle i RID j
Public key of RSU j RSK j
Private key of RSU j K i−j A shared secret key between vehicle i and RSU j L
The ring list generated by RSUs t d
The expired date of L Ls
The ring list used in ring signature t
The timestamp for signature tag
The traceable tag for signature KeyGen(·)
The key generation algorithm in Section III-C Sign sk (·)
The ring signature algorithm in Section III-C Verify Ls (·)
The verification algorithm in Section III-C Enc pk (·)
The public encryption algorithm in Section III-C Dec sk (·)
The public decryption algorithm in Section III-C EN C k (·)
A symmetric encryption algorithm (e.g., AES) DEC k (·)
A symmetric decryption algorithm corresponding to EN C HMAC k (·)
A symmetric hash-based message authentication code a||b
String concatenation of a and b len(·)
Return the number of items in an object P RL Pseudonym revocation list 
C. Ring list distribution
To illustrate this procedure, assume that a vehicle i is communicating with an RSU j. In this process, RSU j always broadcasts RID j in a designated area. When vehicle i receives RID j , it will request the ring list L from RSU j by sending its encrypted public key PID i .
Here the identity-based encryption algorithm Enc pk (·) is adopted to encrypt PID i . The findings in [20] show that there is an efficient way to transform the elements of G 1 to a short representation in such an asymmetric pairing setting. Therefore, let PID i be the short representation of PID i , then Enc RIDj (PID i ) and Dec RSKj (C) are described in Table III. After that, RSU will check whether PID i is in PRL or not. If not, RSU will return a ring list L for the valid vehicle; otherwise, RSU will reject the request. More precisely, the procedure is presented in Table IV .
Because of the capability bottleneck of RSUs, we propose that RSUs store the shared keys locally to reduce computation. 1. Choose r ∈ R Z * q randomly 2. Compute g =ê(P K 1 , RID j ) 3. Transform PID i into PID i 4. Set ciphertext C := (rP, PID i ⊕ H(g r ))
Decryption:
1. For ciphertext C = (U, V ) 2. Decrypt C by using RSK j : 
Ring list distribution:
1. RSU j broadcasts its public key RID j . 2. When vehicle i receives RID j , it sends the encrypted pseudonym C = Enc RID j (PID i ). 3. After RSU j receives the ciphertext C, it computes RID i = Dec RSK j (C). 4. RSU checks if PID i is in the revocation list P RL. If yes, simply rejects the requirement. 5. If PID i is not in P RL, then RSU j computes a shared secret key K j−i =ê(PID i , RSK j ), and uses Encryptthen-MAC approach to deliver the ring list L, i.e., compute C * = EN C K j−i (L) and Σ = HMAC K j−i (C * ||t d ).
Finally sends (C * , Σ, t d ) to the vehicle. 6. After the vehicle receives the ciphertext, it first computes the shared secret key K i−j =ê(PSK i , RID j ), then checks the message authentication code Σ and recovers L = DEC K i−j (C * ).
D. Sign
For a vehicle V k holding a ring list L with an unexpired t d , it first choose n −1 pseudonyms from L randomly to establish a ring list L s , i.e., L s = {PID 1 , PID 2 , . . . , PID k , . . . , PID n }. Then it could use ring signature as described in Section III-C, i.e., σ = Sign PSK k (m||tag||t, L s ), where tag =ê(H 1 (V ID ||t), P K trac ). Finally it broadcasts (m, σ, L s , t, tag). The detailed procedure is illustrated in Table V. 
Sign:
If t d is not expired, then 1. Choose n − 1 P ID from L randomly, and set Ls := {P ID 1 , , P ID 2 , . . . , P ID k , . . . , P ID n } 2. For i from 1 to n and i = k, compute:
E. Verification
When the vehicle, e.g., V receives (m, σ, L s , t, tag), it first checks t to prevent replay attack. If the check passes, then it runs Verify Ls (m||tag||t, σ) to check the validity of the signature.
As mentioned above, consider the limited capacity of OBUs, we suggest adopting batch verification proposed in [21] . Table. VI presents the procedures of single verification and batch verification in detail.
TABLE VI THE PROCEDURES OF VERIFICATION
Single verification:
. . , PID n ) 2. For i from 1 to n , compute:
Batch verification: 1. Given η messages and corresponding signatures, i.e., σ batch = {σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , ση}, M batch = {m 1 , m 2 , . . . , mη}, and L batch = {L s1 , L s2 , . . . , Lsη} 2. For i from 1 to η, and ∀j ∈ {1, len(L si )} , compute:
F. Trace
Once LEA detects misbehaviors in VANETs, it first calculates tag = tag 1/strac and sends {L s ,t} to TRC. For L s = {PID 1 , PID 2 , . . . , PID n }, TRC computes H i = e(H i (VID i ||t), P ), ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n }, and returns ∪ n i=1 {H i }. By comparing tag and ∪ n i=1 {H i }, LEA can determine the signer's pseudonym. Furthermore, LEA would find out the signer's true identity by sending the pseudonym to TRC.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of our scheme. Recalling the assumptions in Section III, each OBU has a secure module called HSM, so that HSM provides an independent environment to perform these required cryptographic operations. Each HSM consists of 5 sub-modules as shown in Fig 4. Hereafter, all analysis is based on the assumption of HSMs.
Checking Module Encryption Module Decryption Module

Signing Module Verifying Module
Hardware Security Module 
A. Correctness
In V2I communication, when vehicle V enters the region within the range of RSU j , it will receive the broadcasting RID j in this region. Once V obtains RID j , it can invoke the Checking Module to check the validity of RSU j . In the process of delivering PID , the correctness and security are guaranteed by the property of identity-based encryption scheme [17] . According to the property of bilinear pairing, we know that:
It is clearly that both RSU j and V obtain the same shared key, and can establish an efficient trusted channel for further communication through symmetric cryptography.
In V2V communication, if the procedure of signing a message m is executed correctly, then the corresponding signature σ must satisfy the verifying equation.
B. Unforgeability
We say that if a signature σ is unforgeable, an adversary should not be able to generate a signature for a new message, given a few signatures corresponding to the messages of his own choice. Since the ring signature scheme [18] we employed is proven to be unforgeable against chosen message attacks in the random oracle model, we note that our protocol is unforgeable.
C. Conditional anonymity
In V2I communication, RSU j only knows the pseudonym of V rather than the true identity of V (i.e.,VID ). As for V2V communication, the true signer is hidden in a set of pseudonyms L. For any eavesdroppers in VANETs, they cannot figure out the true signer from L even though they knowing the corresponding tag. Only the LEA can identify the signer in L through the secret tracing key s trac .
D. Against reply attack
Since each message contains a timestamp in our scheme, namely, once the vehicles figure out that the message is expired, then it will be abandoned before being verified. If an adversary forges a fresh timestamp to replace the original one, then this message must not be able to pass the verification.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme in terms of both computation cost and communication cost. To be specific, we adopt "MNT159" with degree 6 as the asymmetric group G 1 which has a 159-bit base field size. In contrast to some recent work where symmetric groups like "SS512" are employed, we argue that "MNT159" has a shorter presentation for group elements and is more efficient in batch verification according to [21] while providing an approximate secure level [22] . Table VII lists the concrete security level under different elliptic-curve settings.
All experiments are performed on Raspberry Pi 3b+ which is a cheap microcomputer with a 1.4 GHz ARM CPU and 1 GB RAM running Debian Linux operation system. Besides, we invoke the cryptographic framework CHARM [23] to implement the proposed scheme. 
A. Computation cost
To illustrate the computation cost of our scheme clearly, we provide the real-world benchmark in CHARM of different operations in three types of elliptic curves as shown in Table VIII . Furthermore, to present the performance differences, we compare the computation cost of verification of our scheme, and the other two schemes proposed by Zeng et al. [13] , The execution time of one exponentiation operation on G T 10.82 2.06 -Tem
The execution time of one scale multiplication operation on G 1 3.49 9.94 3.32 T mph
The execution time of one map-to-point hash operation on G 1 0.446 31.91 -* The execution time is measured in milliseconds, each operation is evaluated in 1000 times and calculate the average value. The execution time of one map-to-point hash operation on G 1 0.446 31.91 -* The execution time is measured in milliseconds, each operation is evaluated in 1000 times and calculate the average value. Though it seems that our scheme should an employ elliptic curve like Secp160k1 rather than MNT159 according to Table VIII , the bilinear pairings have advantages in building identity-based cryptosystem which can reduce the communication overhead in high-density networks.
It is widely assumed [2] , [3] , [24] that OBUs have limited computation capacity. However, Fig. 5 shows the computation cost of the ring signature depends on the number of ring members. Since a 2-member ring is applied in some lightweight applications such as email signing [25] and VANETs [15] , we argue that privacy can be assured with using the 2-member ring in our scheme. Based on the benchmark, when ring size is 2, the computation cost for each phase and entity is shown in Fig. 6 .
According to the implementation results, we find that distributing a ring list is time-consuming. However, in the phase of ring-list distribution, the shared key could be cached in OBU which will avoid double-counting in the next time.
The results in Table VI -A imply that the schemes based on bilinear pairings have no advantages on the computation of signing and verification procedure. However, in most scenarios, vehicles receive a batch of messages simultaneously rather than a single message. The results in Fig. 7 shows that enabling batch verification will greatly decrease the computation overhead.
B. Communication cost
Because the approaches in Jiang et al.'s scheme [14] is based on the ElGamal cryptosystem where the generated signature Though it seems that our scheme should an employ elliptic curve like Secp160k1 rather than MNT159 according to Table VIII , the bilinear pairings have advantages in building identity-based cryptosystem which can reduce the communication overhead in high-density networks.
Because the approaches in Jiang et al.'s scheme [14] is based on the ElGamal cryptosystem where the generated signature consists of group elements in pairs. On the other hand, the generated signature based on bilinear pairing could consist of one group element (e.g., short signature).
Zeng et al.'s scheme is based on symmetric bilinear pairing where the size of elements in G T is much larger than that [14] 38 308 Zeng et al.'s scheme [13] 90 936 Our scheme 30 90 * The communication cost is evaluated by the built-in function serialize() with enabling compression in CHARM.
in G T under the approximate security setting. The results in Table X also show that our scheme is more efficient in terms of communication costs than the other ring signature-based schemes.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an efficient identity-based batch verification scheme for VANETs based on the ring signature. Unlike other ring signature-based schemes, we restrict the generation of a ring to avoid disruptions from malicious vehicles. Consider that VANETs are highly dense in most real-world scenarios, we adopt batch verification and bilinear pairing to reduce the computation and communication cost respectively. To simulate the environment of OBUs, we implement the proposed scheme on the Raspberry Pi 3b+ platform. By comparing with other related schemes, our scheme is much more efficient in computation and communication with batch mode.
Due to limited space, the approach for finding invalid signatures in batch verification is not shown in this paper. As a possible direction of future work, we will give a more comprehensive illustration of applying batch verification in VANETs. Moreover, it might be interesting to consider building HSMs in real-world applications based on the trusted execution environment (TEE) such as ARM's TrustZone.
